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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

January 13, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
David K. E. Bruce
Under Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Present Status of PSB
Approved Plans D-7c - "Psychological Operations
Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations"
and J-19d - "Break-Off of Korean Armistice
Negotiations".

Attached hereto for your information is an interim progress
report with respect to implementation of PSB Plans D-7c "Psychological
Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations" and
J-19d "Break-Off of Korean Armistice Negotiations".

/s/ Alan G. Kirk

Alan G. Kirk
Director

Enclosure:

1. Interim Progress Report on D-7c
and J-19d, dated January 13, 1953
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(Note: Identical memoranda to Mr. Foster, General Smith and General Young.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.

January 13, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Interim Report on Present Status
of PSB Approved Plans D-7c --
"Psychological Operations Plan
Incident to Korean Cease-Fire
Negotiations", and J-19d --
"Break-Off of Korean Armistice
Negotiations".

1. PSB J-19d "Break-Off of Korean Armistice Negotiations" was developed to establish courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of breakoff of Korean Armistice negotiations. The actual plan with supporting Annexes as approved by the Psychological Strategy Board 18 September 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 4 January 1952 and forwarded to CINCPAC 14 January 1952 is based on three contingencies and lists five broad objectives and seven Annexes with supporting themes and psychological actions.

The timely objectives and courses of action provide adequate and useful guidance to operators for exploitation of the three contingencies which are: (1) Breakoff of Armistice negotiations, (2) Breakoff of negotiations with all-out enemy attack; (3) Fade-out or adjournment without clear cut break and a possibility of renewal at any time. The third contingency closely parallels conditions that presently exist. Consideration is being given to adding a fourth contingency to provide for the possibility of breakoff of negotiations and all out UN attack upon the communists.

Implementation of the plan is the function of Defense, State and CIA. The Department of Defense (Far East Command) has prepared competent plans to implement the tactical overt phase. The State Department has published two supporting guidances covering the first two contingencies and is now preparing a new guidance to provide for the third contingency. Preparation of the CIA operations plan was complicated by lack of trained personnel and facilities and a clear-cut understanding of policy and logistical support from FECOM. A realistic plan has been prepared based upon their existing capabilities. This plan is now going through clearance channels. Examination of the operation plans of Defense and the guidances of State including the outline of the new guidance and CIA implementing covert plan indicate that the overt and covert support will be adequate.

2. PSB D-7c "Psychological Operations Plan Incident to Korean Cease-Fire Negotiations", as approved by the Psychological Strategy Board 25 October 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 21 December 1951 and forwarded to CINCPAC 11 January 1952, prescribes psychological action incident to a

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ceasefire in Korea and prior to political negotiations on Korean issues and contains four psychological objectives; (1) the Republic of Korea, (2) the United Nations' Allies, (3) the World in General and (4) our Adversaries.

The objectives and supporting themes are timely and useful. The implementing agencies are Defense, State and CIA. Defense (FECOM) has prepared two supporting plans for the overt phase and State has published a contingency guidance to become operative upon announcement of the Armistice Agreement. CIA has recently prepared a supporting plan for the covert phase. Final approval of this plan is expected within a few days. The PSB approved plan as it now stands is modern and adequate. Upon approval of the CIA plan both overt and covert support is provided and PSB D-7c can become operative upon the announcement of a ceasefire agreement.

3. Procedures have been established for notification of agencies concerned when conditions set up in the three contingencies eventuate, however, no steps have been taken to establish the fact that conditions similar to those set up in the third contingency of J-19d have existed since 7 October 1952.

4. In sum, Contingency plans PSB D-7c and J-19d as written in 1951 are timely and adequate. The objectives and psychological actions will furnish the desired guidance when the contingencies arise. Improvement could be made in the format and possibly the substance by writing new plans. A fourth contingency for J-19d might be considered desirable at this time to cover all out attack by the UN Command. This contingency, however, could be adequately covered by a supplemental plan. Rewriting plans D-7c and J-19d would require panel meetings and approvals which are time consuming and in all probability would reflect very little improvement in the important features of the plans. It is possible that action is necessary on the part of PSB to formally implement PSB J-19d's third contingency although themes exploiting this condition have been used by overt media since October 1952. Upon final clearance of CIA "Korea Plan" the overt and covert implementation of J-19d and D-7c will be complete. A final report will be made incorporating all supporting plans and guidances of implementing agencies. The final report will recommend: (1) that the plans are adequate and should not be rewritten, and (2) consideration be given to preparation of a supplemental plan covering "All out attack by UN forces upon breakoff of Armistice negotiations."

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FROM:

Psychological Strategy Board (via PP/PP/PL)

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